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Bleak House is presented as a two-fold narrative, divided 
between the first-person retrospective of Esther Summerson and 
the immediate third-person point of view of an anonymous 
“narrator”. It is also a novel dominated by a search for 
documentation, for legal papers, absent wills, missing love 
letters, a judgement in a case that is never set down, in a quest 
for definitive corroboration, for signs that will authenticate and 
confirm the connections between the dead past and the present, 
as a scrap of handwriting can link Honoria Barbary, Nemo and 
Captain Hawdon. The natural question, therefore, is which 
viewpoint in the novel can be received as authoritative? Which 
of these two accounts has the power to conclude; who can, as it 
were, “exactly say”?1 Conventionally, this question has been 
implicitly resolved by identifying the third-person voice as that 
of an authorial narrator while relegating Esther to the 
supplementary role of an interesting but limited observer 
(though this position has altered considerably as more critical 
attention has been directed towards Esther). My intention is 
twofold: firstly, to trace the development of Esther as an 
authorial narrator in her own right, and secondly to observe the 
limitations and instability of the third-person narrator. 
Adjusting the balance between these narrative positions, I will 
examine how they complement and formally elaborate on each 
other, and the extent to which the text develops and sustains 
their authority. 
Two narrative modes occupy Bleak House: the retrospective, 
first-person narrative of Esther Summerson and the third-
person, present-tense narrative voiced by the figure I will call 
the recorder. I use this term rather than “narrator” because I 
want to avoid an a priori identification of the recorder with an 
omniscient narrator, and, as is usually the case, the author.2 I 
also want to position Esther and the recorder as narrators in 
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their own right. Though they are aware of each other — as 
Esther speaks of “my portion of these pages” (p. 17), and the 
recorder observes her: “While Esther sleeps, and while Esther 
wakes” (76) — their differences are immediately apparent. 
Esther is fussy, domestic, coy, less linguistically skilled, 
fundamentally personal, as opposed to the remote, impersonal 
recorder who passes with an ironic deftness through the 
opening passages of the novel. As Esther pointedly notes: “I am 
not clever” (17). The recorder is decidedly clever: verbally 
adept, urbane and knowledgeable. But, where Esther represents 
emotional warmth in the novel, the recorder is not without 
personality. Though the third-person point of view detaches the 
“masculine” recorder from the other characters he is, by turns, 
angry, sardonic, prophetic, contemplative or melancholy, 
possessed of a range of moods and emotions. The real 
distinction, therefore, lies in the breadth of their insight, their 
narrative authority construed here as their power to command 
and situate the informative details of the text. In this sense 
Esther is seen as the most limited, constrained within her 
individualised point of view, whereas the recorder, not bound 
by the limits of presence, exercises such power that he is 
frequently identified as omniscient.3 Esther is placed in the 
subordinate position, holding only a portion of a wider 
construction located firmly within the recorder’s competence. 
Of course, the critical view of Esther has changed 
considerably. Earlier reviewers were indifferent to Esther or 
praised her character for its verisimilitude to the Victorian 
feminine ideal.4 Many subsequent critics were dismissive of 
Esther, echoing Collins: “Esther is at best, I think, a very 
modest character” (126). Esther Summerson was famously 
“rehabilitated” in Alex Zwerdling’s article of 1973,5 and since 
then much critical attention has focused on Dickens’s adept 
psychological portrayal of Esther, while still trying to isolate 
her failures of imagination, or situate her in relationship with 
the “authorial narrator”.6 Much of this reading adheres to a 
different kind of psychological, or even political-psychological 
verisimilitude, analysing Esther as a cypher for the effects of 
repression, be it psychological or patriarchal, or Foucauldian 
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discipline (or policing).7 Nevertheless, approval for Esther’s 
portrayal can swing far enough for Hornback to argue that 
Esther could be construed as the actual narrator of the third-
person portion of Bleak House, in that this point of view is 
consistent with that of Esther’s maturity. In any case, the effort 
has been to realign Esther’s narrative with the rest of the text. 
My interest is in Esther’s narrative itself. 
It is not difficult to see how Esther attracts her share of 
critical distaste. Her manner as narrator can veer from the 
cloying to the obscurantist. Her positions are often 
contradictory. She notes that, “I seem always to be writing 
about myself” (102), but asserts sincerely that, “I mean all the 
time to write about other people” (102). With an unstable self-
image, she exists to herself only when reflected in other people; 
even when writing about herself, she is often writing about 
what other people think of her. This manifests itself in passages 
in which Esther denigrates herself yet covertly draws attention 
to her own value. One early example is particularly overblown: 
when they took me through all the rooms that I might see 
them for the last time; and when some cried, ‘Esther, dear, 
say good-bye to me here, at my bedside, where you first 
spoke so kindly to me!’ and when others asked me only to 
write their names, ‘With Esther’s love;’ and when they all 
surrounded me with their parting presents, and clung to me 
weeping, and cried, ‘What shall we do when dear, dear 
Esther’s gone!’ and when I tried to tell them how forbearing, 
and how good they had all been to me, and how I blessed, 
and thanked them everyone; what a heart I had! (28) 
 
Esther insists that she is praised without cause, but relates 
this praise at tedious length. Similar to this are Esther’s avowals 
of confusion and ignorance, her inability to present her 
perspective as valid. She tends to dismiss her observations, 
undermining her authority: “I write down these opinions, not 
because I believe that this or any other thing was so, because I 
thought so, but only because I did think so” (204). Her 
observations are often framed in a form of irony that can 
occlude their acuity, since for Esther irony comes very close to 
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false modesty, as when she observes Mr Turveydrop bestow his 
blessing on Caddy: “The benignity as he raised his future 
daughter-in-law and stretched out his hand to his son (who 
kissed it with affectionate respect and gratitude), was the most 
confusing sight I ever saw” (293). Her sentimentality, her 
elaborate gestures of modesty, her tendency to diminish the 
force of her own judgements, make her a highly suspect 
narrator. 
Esther’s defenders have long noted that the psychology of 
this behaviour is coherent and believable. For Esther, carrying 
the guilt of her genesis, is “‘set apart’” (19), both (apparently) 
orphaned and illegitmate. Consequently, she is compelled to 
offer up proofs to the reader of the love and respect that should 
be hers automatically. Childhood repression, the certainty that, 
“‘Your mother, Esther, is your disgrace, and you were hers’” 
(19), has instilled in Esther a particular habit of evasiveness, of 
drawing attention while deflecting it. But, while we observe the 
effects of this on Esther’s childhood, Dickens makes another 
point. Little Esther chooses a doll to whom she can tell, “all I 
had noticed since we parted” (17). While critics focus on the 
doll’s role as a surrogate for Esther’s feelings (eventually 
Esther buries Dolly in the garden), the other point is that from 
childhood Esther is a natural narrator. She constitutes and 
secures her identity through story-telling. The adult Esther 
simply transfers her narrative from the silent doll to inert paper. 
And like any narrator, Esther has both a “noticing way” (17) 
and a desire to “understand things better” (17). The problem is 
that Esther has little confidence in her own understanding. This, 
generated in her childhood repression, has complex effects on 
her narrative position. 
A sense of predetermined guilt, of inherited unworthiness, 
colours Esther’s attitude to her narrative. Her illigitimacy 
means that she (like Jo) is not authorised to witness the events 
she does. Her narrative expresses the stresses of this struggle. 
There is a tendency to deflect attention, a characteristic gesture 
of self-effacement. Weeping over a page, she wipes the tears 
away (20). Marking the text, with words or tears, she moves to 
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erase them. For the reader, her attitude resembles that with 
which she confronts the hapless William Guppy: “‘You could 
make no discovery in reference to me that would do me the 
least service, or give me the least pleasure’” (479). Her method 
becomes one of reticence, evasion, obliquity, of the sentence 
initiated and broken off, of hints and confusions. Thus, of Mrs 
Woodcourt and her discomfort: “I don’t know what it was. Or 
at least if I do, now, I thought I did not then. Or at least — but it 
don’t matter” (365). Yet Esther is also compelled to narrate 
because of her sense of a primal crime, a sin in which she is 
both profoundly implicated and an innocent party. 
Despite this, Esther is not an entirely unreliable or 
unobservent narrator. Her sphere is that of relationships and 
domestic detail, and here she is a close observer. It is Esther 
who sights the “extraordinary creatures in rags, secretly groping 
among the swept-out rubbish for pins and other refuse” (47), a 
moment before encountering Miss Flite, foreshadowing the old 
woman’s status as a scavenger among the discarded fragments 
of the law. Esther also has a touch for comic detail as she notes 
the deficiencies in the Jellyby household, including the curtain 
“fastened with a fork” (39), or the souvenir mug, “‘A Present 
from Tunbridge Wells’” (40), lighting the staircase window. 
Cautious as her judgements are — “‘We rather thought… that 
perhaps she was a little unmindful of her home”’ (60) — it is 
the accumulation of detail that she uncovers, such as Peepy 
creeping out of his crib, his teeth chattering (45), that makes her 
reading of the situation incontestable. Esther presents this only 
as opinion, unwilling to legitimise it as fact, yet at a 
sympathetic level we more or less agree. In her skill at 
assembling telling details, however Esther demures we are still 
apt to accept her readings as accurate, almost unconsciously 
aligning ourselves with her attitudes. 
Retrospective, strictly linear, Esther’s narrative obliges us to 
follow her. Esther works in the past tense, but she adheres, 
almost consistently, to the absolute temporal sequence of her 
narrative. Even though she is writing from a point in time well 
after what she narrates has occurred, she rarely violates the 
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process of her narrative to look forward, always confining 
herself to what she can immediately observe. Esther has a talent 
for orderly domestic arrangements, but this is no mere neurotic 
habit, for if a linear narrative implies a structure, it also implies 
an attempt at making meaning within a temporal process, 
developing a sequence of cause and effect rather than mere 
contiguity. As such, she must arrange events, withholding 
selected facts, delaying premature revelations. Her method 
assumes a certain authority over the text: the right to treat 
things strictly as they happen. And, as Esther works from 
beginning to end, she develops her talents as a narrator, 
demonstrating a growing maturity in her handling of the 
material. 
While overtly Esther binds herself to the practical, her 
narrative is not without flashes of symbolism or imagery. There 
is a developing sophistication in the images Esther chooses, 
reflecting her own improving command over the text. The early 
image of Ada and Rick at the piano as Ada sings — “their 
shadows blended together, surrounded by strange forms” (68) 
— is both commonplace and sentimental.8 Later, however, 
Esther’s presentation of Rick being driven on a hearse into the 
gathering darkness of a sunset by the vampiric lawyer Vholes 
(471), deftly anticipates Rick’s eventual wasting and death in 
Chancery. Esther displays a growing consciousness of the 
temporality of her narrative, a surer presentation of the telling 
detail, as when she captures Hortense walking “shoeless, in the 
wet grass” (231). The last words of the chapter, drawing 
attention to this gesture with its strange blend of masochism, 
anger and defiance, show how acute Esther’s presentiments can 
be. 
Despite this, Esther remains prone to lapses and diversions. 
Her relationship with Alan Woodcourt is particularly given to 
these evasions:  
I have forgotten to mention — at least I have not 
mentioned — that Mr Woodcourt was the same dark young 
surgeon whom we had met at Mr Badger’s. Or that Mr 
Jarndyce invited him to dinner that day. Or that he came. Or, 
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that when they were all gone, and I said to Ada, ‘Now, my 
darling, let us have a little talk about Richard!’ Ada laughed 
and said — 
 But I don’t think it matters what my darling said. 
She was always merry (182). 
 
As I suggested earlier, this springs from Esther’s sense of 
insecurity, but it is also connected to the fundamental processes 
of the novel, not simply psychological but structural. Bleak 
House is a mystery novel. I use this term not to indicate a work 
of formal detection, though, as J. Hillis Miller pointed out, 
Bleak House is full of detectives,9 but to place it in the category 
of the Victorian novel of mysteries, as a text structured by its 
relationship with the enigma, the concealed and the illicit.10 One 
of the mysteries of Bleak House is that of Lady Dedlock. The 
narrative is driven towards the exposure of her hidden shame, 
through the discovery, coordinated through various writings, 
including court documents and letters, of her relationship with 
Captain Hawdon. And the cases in Bleak House are the same. 
Whether it is Lady Dedlock’s crime or the cause in Jarndyce 
and Jarndyce, the charge is always abandonment, child-
endangerment, be it discarding Esther or the neglect of the 
wards in Chancery, an abrogation of responsibility in an 
indifferent universe. This mystery narrative intimately concerns 
Esther (she is its absolute material sign: the abandoned child), 
but it is one which she is both desperate to conceal and 
compelled to excavate. 
Esther’s problem as a narrator is her lack of self-worth, her 
failure to assume her judgements and observations are reliable. 
Hence, her pose of inarticulacy. However, Esther’s narrative, 
over which she sustains her conflicted authorship, works 
towards her origins, her illigitimacy, unravelling the strands of 
implication that bind her to her parentage, making her a party in 
the case of Bleak House. Esther is superficially closed to 
enquiry, letting others, such as John Jarndyce, dictate for her 
what she will or will not know about her heritage. Yet, as 
Esther reveals, she almost always dreams of her godmother’s 
house (172), a place connected in her thoughts with “shadowy 
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speculations” of her “earliest history” (131). Beneath her 
reluctance there is an intense psychological need to know. The 
mystery that surrounds Esther’s birth, the mystery that becomes 
for her a problem of self-knowledge, sustains the difficulty we 
have in interpreting her account. At the same time the mystery 
narrative necessitates sequence, enabling Esther’s writing. 
There can be no “giving away” of the culprit or the cause before 
the right time, and thus we have Esther’s strict attention to 
detail, her linear approach, as it is joined with the larger text to 
work towards the explication of her parentage. In tracing Lady 
Dedlock, however, Esther is also forced to examine the very 
secret, the transgression, that profoundly shapes her sense of 
identity and characterises her evasive method. 
As Esther closes with the Chancery suit by recovering the 
identity of Miss Barbary (her mother’s maiden name), her 
orphan’s inheritance, she comes closer to her originating sense 
of disgrace and difference. Her narrative develops along this 
faultline. As the narrative expands, so to does Esther’s 
command as a narrator, yet she is also threatened, as much as 
her mother, by the truth she reveals. The consequence is 
division from herself, which is also a potential loss of identity 
and authorship. Her illness results in scarring that obscures the 
resemblance to her mother, even as it also leads to their 
meeting, yet her hallucinations, with their confusion in times 
and memory, pressage an even more disturbing loss of control 
over her own experiences. Inevitably, there is an encounter with 
her mother, the moment the connection between them is 
recognised. For Esther this activates her crisis of alienation on 
the Ghost’s Walk: 
when my echoing footsteps brought it suddenly into my mind 
that there was a dreadful truth in the legend of the Ghost’s 
Walk; that it was I, who was to bring calamity upon the 
stately house; and that my warning feet were haunting it even 
then. Seized with an augmented terror of myself that turned 
me cold, I ran from myself and everything… (454). 
 
Near to discovering herself, Esther rediscovers how profoundly 
she is set apart by fear and guilt. Her only option is to attempt 
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to flee from herself. Before it can be concluded the text will 
revert once more to the iteration of Esther’s search for and 
location of her mother, and it is here that Esther’s developing 
narrative seeks resolution in merging with that of the recorder 
and the detection that she has, up until then, avoided. 
Much of the detective narrative lies outside of Esther’s 
account in the domain of the recorder, whose power over space 
constrained within the present-tense makes him an exemplary 
field of observation who presents clues for decoding by the 
reader. From the opening, in which events and persons seem so 
dissociated that there is no difference between “a little mad old 
woman in a squeezed bonnet” — Miss Flite, of course — and 
“another ruined suitor, who periodically appears from 
Shropshire” — Gridley — and “a sallow prisoner” (7) who will 
never reappear, the recorder gradually sifts, focuses and 
develops the evidentiary structure of the novel. Initially all 
information is presented as being of equal value; the signs are 
indistinguishable, like the creatures and objects in the mud. 
Everything that seems dislocated here gradually comes to 
assume significance, but it is clear from the outset that we are 
dealing with a mode of apprehension that is different, perhaps 
fundamentally, from Esther’s. For though Esther is bound to 
temporal sequence and chooses to narrate what she observes 
from her fixed location in space (with few exceptions), the 
recorder is free, within limits, in both dimensions. 
The present-tense position of the recorder allows him to 
manipulate time within certain bounds; thus, in the first pages 
of the second chapter the recorder is able to present Lady 
Dedlock in Paris, her place in town and Chesney Wold almost 
simultaneously. Yet because the recorder’s simultaneity means 
that no instant in time can be shown as distinct from any other 
instant (they are all aspects of Now), the recorder is strangely 
limited in time, able to illustrate the present in all its detail but 
only vaguely conscious of sequence, and unable to know the 
future in the way that Esther, who does have knowledge of 
forthcoming events, can.11 The recorder can apprehend events 
only as a conglomerate. Whereas Esther aims to assemble the 
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progress to which her opening refers, to unfold a process, the 
recorder generates only occurences, isolated fragments of action 
in which causality is generally obscured, awaiting an act of 
interpretation by the reader. And thus the recorder is obsessed 
with details and surfaces,  with reiterated “maybes” and 
“seems”. These descriptive tics themselves suggest a sort of 
uncertainty, an inability to fully comprehend interior states. 
Describing Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock, for instance, the 
narrator can only speculate: 
They appear to take as little note of one another, as any two 
people, enclosed within the same walls, could. But whether 
each evermore watches and suspects the other… whether 
each is evermore prepared at all points for the other… all this 
is hidden, for the time, in their own hearts (150). 
 
Since the recorder can never escape the momentary, what is 
reserved “for the time” cannot be determined within the 
absolute present of his narrative. 
Instead, the recorder emphasises his command over 
dimensions in space, literally able to follow as the crow flies: 
Mr Snagsby standing at his shop-door looking up at the 
clouds, sees a crow, who is out late, skim westward over the 
leaden slice of sky belonging to Cook’s Court. The crow flies 
straight across Chancery Lane and Lincoln’s Inn Garden, 
into Lincoln’s Inn Fields (119). 
 
This enables the recorder’s radical comprehensiveness, his 
power to speculate on connections, to navigate gulfs in space 
and parallel conjunctions in the social structure. But this spatial 
gesture, like the fixation on present details, can also be 
discursive, diffusing rather than focusing attention. In the 
paragraph before Tulkinghorn is shot the recorder ranges over 
woods, roads, gardens, rivers, wharves, the sea, the whole city 
of London itself (584), everywhere, that is, except where the 
murder occurs. Of course, we have no wish to know who the 
murderer is, yet the passage illustrates the flaws in the 
recorder’s omniscience. The recorder operates freely within 
physical space, but with such dexterity that points of view 
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proliferate until it becomes difficult to assume a clear 
perspective. 
Omniscient in space yet constrained in time, the recorder at 
first resembles the fashionable intelligence that locates Lady 
Dedlock: “the fashionable intelligence — which, like the fiend, 
is omniscient of the past and present, but not the future” (12). 
This aside suggests the recorder’s freedom from spatial 
limitation and his inability to be properly conscious of the 
future. Indeed, the fashionable intelligence “knows all 
fashionable things” (11), reminding us of the recorder’s pose of 
omniscience and his persona as the urbane observer of upper-
class society. Yet the world of fashion is a small one, and the 
fashionable intelligence is, some way into the novel, confronted 
with its own limitations: “The astonished fashionable 
intelligence hardly knows where to have [Lady Dedlock]. To-
day, she is at Chesney Wold; yesterday, she was at her house in 
town; tomorrow, she may be abroad, for anything the 
fashionable intelligence can with confidence predict” (195). 
Consequently, the fashionable intelligence is displaced by Mr 
Tulkinghorn. 
Tulkinghorn makes his appearance “in fashion,” in Lady 
Dedlock’s presence. His powers, as much as those of the 
fashionable intelligence, are based on his knowledge of society 
and in particular his possession of family secrets, his 
“mysterious halo of family confidences” (13). Thus, 
Tulkinghorn temporarily establishes his authority and is 
empowered to extend it. Tulkinghorn is a persistent and 
assiduous detective, eventually retrieving the evidence he needs 
to incriminate Lady Dedlock by finding the letters and 
examples of handwriting that allow him to reconstruct her story. 
This permits him a brief period of ascendency over the 
narrative: “there is a rather increased sense of power in him” 
(507). Yet the paradox of Tulkinghorn’s knowledge is that it 
enforces stasis. Like Chancery itself, the power of 
determination leads only to delay and inertia. Tulkinghorn is 
caught in a peculiar double-bind. Like the recorder, he can see 
and know everything, yet he is incapable of acting on his 
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knowledge, since action would compromise the secrecy on 
which his power is predicated. Even in threatening Lady 
Dedlock his demand is that she do nothing to jeopardise her 
secret. Consequently, he exhibits no desire, and no power, 
outside of the power of knowledge. And thus, eventually his 
narrative authority, his hold over the strands of narrative (Lady 
Dedlock’s story) is compromised, terminated in the most 
violent manner when he is shot dead by Hortense. 
It is as Tulkinghorn’s agent that we first encounter Inspector 
Bucket, materialising like the fiend of the fashionable 
intelligence itself: “Mr Snagsby is dismayed to see, standing 
with an attentive face between himself and the lawyer… a 
person… who was not there when he himself came in, and has 
not entered by the door or by either of the windows” (275). This 
fantastic mobility characterises the recorder, the fashionable 
intelligence, Bucket, and even Mr Tulkinghorn: 
From… the Dedlock property, Mr Tulkinghorn transfers 
himself to… London. His manner of coming and going 
between the two places, is one of his impenetrabilities. He 
walks into Chesney Wold as if it were next door to his 
chambers, and returns to his chambers as if he had never 
been out of Lincoln’s Inn Fields (514). 
 
Following this appearance, then, Bucket is always marked by 
his association with Tulkinghorn and, by extension, Chancery. 
All four figures, the recorder, the fashionable intelligence, 
Bucket and Tulkinghorn, represent to some degree Dickens’s 
Asmodean fantasy,12 a legitimized fictional power to observe 
directly the inner workings of society, and the household in 
particular. In the case of Bucket and Tulkinghorn, this fantasy 
generates a particular tension, the fear that narrative authority 
will express itself as authoritarianism, as surveillance and, 
ultimately, discipline. This problem is particularly evident in 
the portrayal of Bucket and his policemen. For the presentation 
of the police force in action is bound up in the expression of 
unease, a conflict between the invasive but necessary processes 
of detection and urban control, and the integrity of the 
individual. We can never be entirely comfortable with Bucket 
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as he relentlessly orders Jo to “move on” partly to obscure the 
tracks of the investigation that Tulkinghorn pursues, or arrests 
Gridley, or charms the Bagnet family in order to quietly detain 
Mr George. Just as the chaos of an urban enclosure such as 
Tom-all-Alone’s demands the intercession of Bucket and his 
police officers, the mastery that they assert and the facts that 
they command stir unease in the middle-class subject. This is 
evident in Snagsby’s dilemma. After his encounter with Mr 
Bucket and his descent into Tom-all-Alone’s, Snagsby feels he 
is guilty of something; just what, he cannot say. His guilt is 
sufficient, because no one bothers to spy on Snagsby except 
Mrs Snagsby (whose efforts are cultivated by Tulkinghorn). 
Thus, both the effects and the techniques of discipline are 
internalised. Yet it is Bucket who finally dismisses Mrs 
Snagsby to her confusion, as if her methods were not an 
extension of his methodology; and so for the middle-class: they 
are both drawn to and repelled by the agents of discipline, 
immersed in their structures yet alienated from their authority. 
The presentation of Bucket must always carry the residue of 
this anxiety. Yet despite Bucket’s implication in Tulkinghorn’s 
system of secrets and repression, the two steadily move apart, 
for where Tulkinghorn ends up entirely silenced, Bucket 
assumes a wider and wider control over the text. As Bucket is 
detached from Tulkinghorn, so the voice of the recorder 
gradually moves from identification with Tulkinghorn and 
Chancery to Inspector Bucket. 
Jo’s terrified avowal of Mr Bucket that, “‘He’s in all manner 
of places, all at wunst’” (559), aligns Bucket with the recorder, 
since it identifies his control over space and his singularity in 
time. And thus there are Bucket’s demonic powers, his hypnotic 
finger, his near immanence: “Time and place cannot bind Mr 
Bucket. Like man in the abstract, he is here today and gone 
tomorrow — but, very unlike man indeed, he is here again the 
next day” (626). Steadily, Bucket approaches identification 
with the voice of the recorder as his command over the mystery 
extends to the point where his case, which is almost the 
denouement of the novel, is complete, and lesser detectives are 
unmasked and pushed aside: “‘I am damned if I am a-going to 
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have my case spoilt, or interfered with, or anticipated by so 
much as half a second of time, by any human being in 
creation’” (643). At his triumph, Hortense calls him “‘a Devil’” 
(795). And so he ascends: 
There, he mounts a high tower in his mind, and looks out far 
and wide. Many solitary figures he perceives, creeping 
through the streets; many solitary figures out on heaths, and 
roads, and lying under haystacks. But the figure he seeks is 
not among them. Other solitaries he perceives in nooks of 
bridges, looking over; and in shadowed places down by the 
river’s level; and a dark, dark shapeless object drifting with 
the tide, more solitary than all, clings with a drowning hold 
on his attention (637). 
 
Here, Bucket’s breadth of vision, his mastery of the urban 
scene, the rivers, roads and bridges, his knowledge of all figures 
moving within them, equates him with the recorder. His 
perception is virtually limitless, simultaneous and 
comprehensive, an immediate imaginitive closure with the 
subjects of the city that recreates narratorial omniscience. But 
his moment of triumph is also his failure. The emphasis on the 
solitariness of the figures Bucket sees compounds his inability 
to integrate these subjects within an empathic, social whole. 
The one object that he seeks, despite the comprehensiveness of 
his vision, is invisible to him. Bucket therefore turns to Esther, 
and the two modes of narrative achieve fusion. 
Naturally it is Bucket who seeks out Esther, who exercises 
his superior knowledge to engage her in the crisis, but Bucket’s 
role has already altered. After the death of Tulkinghorn he is 
more and more an independent agent who asserts his authority 
in a manner that is profoundly different from the lawyer’s. As 
he assures Sir Leicester: “‘let me beg you not to trouble your 
mind, for a moment, as to anything having come to my 
knowledge. I know so much about so many characters, high and 
low, that a piece of information, more or less, don’t signify a 
straw’” (638). Tulkinghorn deals only in the secrets of the 
upper-classes. To him, knowledge is both validated and 
acquired in strict relationship to the power it implies. Bucket 
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does not suggest that his knowledge is worthless but that any 
additional detail simply lies within the scope of his existing 
sympathies, his perspective as “a benignant philosopher not 
disposed to be severe upon the follies of mankind” (626). 
Thereafter Bucket solves the Tulkinghorn murder and arranges 
for the buying up and suppression of the incriminating papers. 
Observing Hortense’s letter-writing, taking back the letters, 
even matching the wadding from the pistol shot, Bucket takes 
control of the text and its scattered clues, collating them and 
presenting an intelligible whole. Despite his powers, he is not 
able to contain the crisis. Lady Dedlock is forewarned and flees. 
From this point Bucket’s goal is quite different, for rather than 
being charged with the task of investigation and arrest, his is a 
mission of compassion. His interpretative powers are turned to 
the text of Sir Leicester’s instructions: “Sir Leicester writes 
upon the slate, ‘Full forgiveness. Find —’”  (669). In accepting 
this commission, Bucket has moved from the duties of the 
police towards a humane expression of forgiveness. For the first 
time it may be that the doctrine of mercy can offer a counter-
weight to the inert mass of the institution, a correction to the 
debilitating discourse of transgression, judgement and 
punishment. Bucket is still wielding his detective powers, 
however; his first step is to search Lady Dedlock’s chambers, 
where his clue is Esther’s handkerchief. Immediately, he is 
drawn to the personal. Once the detective has stepped outside of 
his institutional role, his authority is no longer equal to the task. 
In fact, his official status will impede him. He needs Esther 
because it is only her presence that will allow him to make an 
emotional contact with Lady Dedlock and complete his 
mission: 
‘If I follow her alone, she, being in ignorance of what Sir 
Leicester Dedlock, Baronet, has communicated to me, may 
be driven to desperation. But if I follow her in the company 
of a young lady that she has a tenderness for — I ask no 
questions, and I say no more than that — she will give me 




The detective voice can only deliver its message by appealing 
to a direct human relationship, and so the narrative is passed 
over to Esther. 
Esther is drawn into a final pursuit of the mother, a chance to 
reiterate and perhaps exorcise the burden of received parental 
guilt, and to confront the complex of fear and uncertainty that 
characterises her writing. Esther has an opportunity to complete 
the story, to assert her authority over Lady Dedlock’s crime and 
to offer forgiveness. Bucket, like the recorder, can supply the 
means, but the end of this narrative must be experienced 
directly. It is as if the matrix of Bucket’s policing is not entirely 
competant but must be interpreted through the individualised 
imagination of Esther. Significantly, however, Esther must also 
see Bucket’s reality, making her own descent into the realm of 
urban mystery that the police command. She traverses those 
fearful enclosures, the docks, the “labyrinth of streets” (676), 
that are primarily represented in the novel by Tom-all-Alone’s, 
but are ubiquitously the scene of the repressed and the 
unutterable. Esther and Bucket travel together, sharing the same 
carriage, suggestive of the way in which Esther’s narrative and 
that of the recorder share the medium of the novel, Bleak 
House, and coincide at this point. The London that Esther sees, 
then, is the recorder’s London of urban mystery: oppressive, 
dreamlike, secretive: “The river had a fearful look, so overcast 
and secret, creeping away so fast between the low flat lines of 
shore: so heavy with indistinct and awful shapes, both of 
substance and shadow: so death-like and mysterious” (678). 
Riding with Inspector Bucket, Esther is forced to engage in and 
reinterpret the mysteries with which the recorder is familiar but 
cannot bring to light without her intercession. 
Esther’s narrative is taut and powerful, stripped of her usual 
obliquity. She has matured as a writer, and this is not 
necessarily due to Dickens’s intervention. Dickens does not 
simply ventriloquise Esther,13 but clearly shows how the crisis 
pushes her beyond the bounds of her usual performance. Cast, 
as she notes, outside of her “right mind” (674), Esther cannot 
resort to the evasions with which she is familiar. Esther 
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demonstrates her inner strength and persistence; she is patient 
and remarkably enduring. As Bucket observes: “‘I never see a 
young woman in any station of society… conduct herself like 
you have conducted yourself, since you was called out of your 
bed. You’re a pattern, you know’” (684). And for the first time, 
Esther must take the initiative. She interrogates the 
brickmakers’ wives, pressing them with questions. Asking after 
her mother, she finally implicates herself, takes responsibility 
for the connection, even to the point of ordering Bucket: “‘You 
will not desert this lady we are in search of; you will not 
abandon her on such a night, and in such a state of mind as I 
know her to be in!’” (689). Esther has acknowledged her own 
need as the narrative moves towards connection with the 
mother, and this act of discovery is her moment of maturity. 
The narrative, after the delay of the false trail, gravitates 
towards its centre: the graveyard that is the final locus of 
dissolution, the true heart of the fog that envelops Chancery in 
the opening of the novel. For Esther, both the physical and the 
psychological seem to lose their definition, for this is the point 
of maximum crisis. 
I have the most confused impressions of that walk. I recollect 
that it was neither night nor day; that morning was dawning, 
but the street-lamps were not yet put out; that the sleet was 
still falling, and that all the ways were deep with it.... I 
recollect the wet house-tops, the clogged and bursting gutters 
and water-spouts… the narrowness of the courts by which 
we went. At the same time I remember... that the stained 
house-fronts put on human shapes and looked at me; that 
great water gates seemed to be opening and closing in my 
head, or in the air; and that unreal things were more 
substantial than the real (712-3). 
 
Esther intuits in this confusion the same chaos of categories, the 
sense of everything “indistinguishable in the mire” (5) that the 
recorder confronts in the first passages of the novel. However, 
this image of the breaking and bursting of channels towards the 
end of Bleak House stands in contrast to the static waters lying 
in flood around Chesney Wold (11), and the thaw, the opening 
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of water gates in Esther’s mind, contradicts the “freezing 
mood” (13) of Lady Dedlock, for this catastrophe is also 
potentially a transformation, a point where the tension in Bleak 
House and Esther’s narrative can be discharged. 
That transformation is never to be entirely realised. Bucket, 
for all his mastery, has come too late. Esther has come too late. 
As Esther sees Lady Dedlock lying in the mud — “drenched in 
a fearful wet of such a place, which oozed and splashed down 
everything” (713) — which is kindred to law and equity, she 
sees, through a discontinuous yet analogous leap which is 
similar to every other connection which proliferates through the 
novel, “the mother of the dead child” (713). In this phrase 
Esther recognises the complex of the mother of the child, 
herself, who had been better not born, and at the same time 
allows the guilty mother to die in order to requite the sins of the 
guiltless child. Unable consciously to accept what she knows, 
even language becomes meaningless: “They changed clothes in 
the cottage. I could repeat the words in my mind, and I knew 
what they meant of themselves; but I attached no meaning to 
them in any other connexion” (713). Thus Esther moves to the 
woman she convinces herself is Jenny still searching for a clue, 
the means to complete the quest, a further point of intercession 
with the mystery: “She lay there, who had so lately spoken to 
my mother.... She who had brought my mother’s letter, who 
could give me the only clue to where my mother was; she, who 
was to guide us to rescue and save her” (713). The mystery will 
not be solved; there will be no final confession from Lady 
Dedlock that will explain the crimes of an irremediable past. 
Bucket and Esther have located the mother on the edge of the 
gate, on the threshold of the irrecoverable loss of all meaning, 
but the solution is here circumscribed. Neither they, nor 
narrative, can pursue the mystery any further. Their authority is 
here terminated. 
Bucket and Esther, though briefly able to unify the novel’s 
modes of perception, to bring the institutional and the personal 
into complementary rather than supplementary relationship, do 
not definitively succeed, but find that mystery dissipates even 
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as they approach closest to it. Thereafter, Bucket is able to 
retrieve the final will in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, and Esther is 
permitted, perilously, to imagine that the suit may eventually 
end well. But Jarndyce and Jarndyce will exhaust itself and the 
papers will be thrown into the street, finally equal with the mud, 
and Esther’s new world can only begin in the aftermath of the 
death of Richard Carstone. Marianna Torgovnick, among 
others, finds a resurgence of the old Esther’s voice in the last 
chapters of Bleak House, in what she calls Esther’s “sentimental 
performance”.14 It is true that Esther wins exculpation but is 
denied full self-realisation. She will always be fundamentally 
dependent on others for her own sense of self-worth. From the 
retrospective standpoint of Esther’s narrative, however, this is 
still the same Esther with whom we began. Her writing remains 
an artifact of her experience. Esther has always presented her 
self obliquely, inviting us, like John Jarndyce, to know her 
better than she knows herself. Her last utterance hovers on this 
same coyness, this half-realised knowledge: 
 I did not know that; I am not certain I know it now. 
But I know that my dearest little pets are very pretty, and that 
my darling is very beautiful, and that my husband is very 
handsome, and that my guardian has the brightest and most 
benevolent face that was ever seen; and that they can very 
well do without much beauty in me — even supposing — 
(770). 
 
Breaking off, Esther delays discovery, closing Bleak House in 
eternal supposition. This narrative gesture indicates Esther’s 
command of another aspect of narration, the generation of 
meaningful pauses, of a suspense that cannot, in this case, be 
satisfied. The Esther revealed here is the Esther that we have 
been reading all along: the Esther who is mistress of a second, 
restored Bleak House. 
While the recorder is emphatically mobile, unsettled, it is 
Esther who has the power to order homes, to create an internal 
domestic economy that offers stability and shelter. Only Esther 
has the sensibility immersed in the world of continuous human 
consequence to find a place fixed enough to write from with 
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consistency. The recorder’s last words, like the unheard final 
ruling in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, fade in “dull repose” (767). 
The properties in Chancery, like Tom-All-Alone’s, or Chesney 
Wold, or even the first Bleak House of Tom Jarndyce, fall to 
ruin. Esther asserts order within a chaotic universe tending to 
decay. The Bleak House for which Esther holds the keys, then, 
is exactly modelled on the first Bleak House of her description: 
“delightfully irregular” (62), spatially complex, labyrinthine in 
structure, cluttered with detail, a “quaint variety” (63) in 
“perfect neatness” (63). The plan of Bleak House suggests the 
structure of Bleak House: interconnected, various, unusual. But 
this is not the recorder’s domain; it is Esther’s. As she 
emphasises its irregularity, its strangeness, its sense of 
submerged order within a complex structure (in accordance to 
her “methods and inventions” (751)), we can imagine the novel 
as a whole. Thus, following this analogue, Bleak House 
ultimately falls within Esther’s authority, the product of her 
capacity for conscious design within the chaos of experience. 
In the Dickens canon, Bleak House is unique for its 
deployment of two narrative voices. For a long time the voice 
of the recorder has been the voice of the narrator: if not more 
authoritative then certainly more authorial. But the third-person 
recorder is not the only narrator in Bleak House. Even Esther’s 
supporters have often overlooked her function as a narrator. The 
psychological realism of her presentation also determines 
aspects of her narrative, her habits of obliqueness and evasion, 
the stance of self-effacement. Nevertheless, Esther is both 
capable and observant as a narrator, exhibiting a developing 
control of her material, though she is circumscribed by her 
close attention to the present and the personal, and the stresses 
inherent in her relationship with the mystery of Lady Dedlock’s 
crime. Naturally, the recorder has the appearance of greater 
facility, such mobility in space that he is commonly referred to 
as omniscient. The use of the present-tense tends to make this 
narrator’s position unstable, limited to its very immediacy, as 
opposed to Esther’s attempts to discover some sort of linear 
pattern in her experience. Furthermore, the recorder is reflected 
in several internal analogues, ranging from the fashionable 
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intelligence to Tulkinghorn to Inspector Bucket, all 
characterised by their perceptiveness, their virtual immanence, 
and also by their complicity in the structures of Chancery, 
policing and discipline. These are also unstable positions, and 
circumscribed in unexpected ways. Ultimately, not even 
Inspector Bucket can resolve (if not solve) Lady Dedlock’s 
crime without Esther’s assistance, suggesting that institutional 
authority is, in some important sense, limited by the personal, 
individual imagination that Esther represents. Thus, in the 
crucial chapters of Bleak House, the pursuit of Lady Dedlock, 
Esther and Bucket work together, effectively compounding 
their narrative positions. Their quest for Lady Dedlock is also a 
technical failure. Narrative can never close conclusively with 
mystery, but it is only in the synthesis of the narrative positions 
that Esther and the recorder assume that we can approach its 
limits. This is as much as the text of Bleak House authorises. 
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